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ABSTRACT
The proliferation of mobile communication and computing devices, in particular smart mobile
phones, is almost paralleled with the increasing number of mobile device forensics tools in the
market. Each mobile forensics tool vendor, on one hand claims to have a tool that is best in
terms of performance, while on the other hand each tool vendor seems to be using different
standards for testing their tools and thereby defining what support means differently. To
overcome this problem, a testing framework based on a series of tests ranging from basic
forensics tasks such as file system reconstruction up to more complex ones countering antiforensic techniques is proposed. The framework, which is an extension of an existing effort done
in 2010, prescribes a method to clearly circumscribe the term support into precise levels. It also
gives an idea of the standard to be developed and accepted by the forensic community that will
make it easier for forensics investigators to quickly select the most appropriate tool for a
particular mobile device.
Keywords: mobile device forensics, digital forensics, forensics tool testing, forensics tool
evaluation, testing framework, support profiles

1. INTRODUCTION
The number of mobile devices (MD) is
increasing (Baggili, Mislan, & Rogers, 2007),
as well as the ways they are being used in our
everyday professional and private activities.
This is evidenced, for example, through the
immense growth of cellular subscriptions
(which is expected to reach almost seven
billion by the end of 2014 (International
Telecommunication Union (ITU), 2014) and
the volume of SMS exchanged that was close
to 6.1 trillion in 2010 (International
Telecommunication Union (ITU), 2010).
Butler also stated that, 41% of the population
uses the embedded digital cameras in their
mobile phones, while 13%, 10% and 21% use
them for internet access, radio access and
mini games respectively (Butler, 2010).
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Modalities of how mobile devices are being
used range from simple voice calls,
audio/video conferencing, emails, short
messages, social networking media, chatting,
internet browsing, GPS navigation, pictures,
videos, and standalone application. MDs are a
very good source of information regarding
various activities of their users and thus serve
as some kind of digital behavioral archives
(Gonzalez, Hung, & Friedberg, 2011). The
artifacts thus produced potentially create a
wealth of digital evidence possibly highly
relevant
to
different
law-enforcement
organizations and legal institutions (such as
criminal and civil court cases) (Butler, 2010).
Numerous criminal offenders have been
convicted partly due to the evidence from
either their mobile phones and/or those of
their respective victims. In fact, more than
80% of court cases in US have some form of
Page 221
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digital evidence linked to them (Baggili et al.,
2007; Butler, 2010). Consequently, the need
and the demand for tools that are capable of
extracting,
archiving,
reconstructing,
analyzing and presenting digital evidence
(termed as mobile device forensics tools or
MDFT) is on the rise. Most often two or more
tools are used to extract data from mobile
devices (for instance
smart phones) to
validate the results and to ensure that not a
single piece of information has been missed or
lost (Armstrong, 2003; Butler, 2010).
That is why, (Jansen, Delaitre, &
Moenner, 2008) assert that these tools should
be reliable enough to provide valid results,
which can be admissible in the court of law.
In the course of this research, the term
validity refers to the ability of the tool to
identify, extract and reconstruct a digital
object in the same state as the MD user was
presented
with.
This
includes
the
reconstruction of the binary content of the file
(even if fragmented) and the ability to
represent any file objects with the
corresponding metadata via its ‘natural’
application.
In addition, (Ahmed & Dharaskar, 2008)
elaborate that digital evidence is a necessity
as users now use their mobile phones to store
almost any kind of information about
themselves, which underlines the requirements
that MDFTs have to extract electronic
evidence without altering any data (AlZarouni, 2006). This can be done only by
tools that fully support a particular function
in the extraction process, hence no mobile
forensic tool can claim to fully support any
particular phone (MSAB Blog, 2011). Their
compatibility and abilities should be explicitly
stated to help an investigator in the selection
of an appropriate tool.
The engineering behind the commercial
MDFTs is usually proprietary and not clear to
the investigators. On the other side, the open
source tools are not documented properly and
they undergo constant changes with respect to
their design and functionalities (Baggili et al.,
2007). Since the role of MDFT in digital
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investigations is crucial and potentially
definitive in deciding the outcome of legal
cases, investigators need to be assured in the
accuracy of the tools or their potential error
rates, which qualifies the extent of support to
mobile
devices
and
eventually
its
quantification (Baggili et al., 2007; MSAB
Blog, 2011).
Currently, the only framework available is
from the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) (Baggili et al., 2007;
National
Institute
of
Standards
and
Technology (NIST), 2010a, 2010b), which is
being used as a set of recommendations rather
than a standard for MDFT testing (Baggili et
al., 2007). The framework was defined in
2010, and it is obvious that in the meantime
mobile devices have evolved a lot so
modification
and
extension
to
the
specifications and associated test plans are
truly needed.
The tools should produce valid results
based on what is really needed in terms of
data objects that are admissible in the court
of law (Jansen et al., 2008). Most of the
investigators face a great challenge of
selecting the appropriate tool capable of
producing a forensically sound evidence
(Kubi, Saleem, & Popov, 2011; Saleem,
Popov, & Baggili, 2014; Saleem, Popov, &
Kubi, 2013; Saleem & Popov, 2013).
Therefore, we need a standardized tool testing
framework for MDFTs.

1.1 Research Problem
Due to the lack of any standards, each tool
vendor defines the term ‘support’ differently.
This creates enormous and challenging
difficulties for an investigator to know and
understand what each tool vendor means by
the term ‘supported’. Most of the forensic tool
vendors claim to support the highest number
of phones, which has become the central focus
rather than the quality (for instance the
capability and the accuracy) of the respective
tool (Curran, Robinson, Peacocke, & Cassidy,
2010; MSAB Blog, 2011). These mobile
forensic tools are important to law
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enforcement agencies in solving criminal
investigations. However, if the results
produced by these tools are incorrect or the
tool does not perform well for the important
types of evidence in a specific case then the
results might be deemed inadmissible in the
court of law (Guo, Slay, & Beckett, 2009).
Once a tool vendor claims support for a
phone, the term support should be qualified.
Sometimes extraction of call logs and text
messages alone is enough for an MD to be
included into the list of supported MDs. This
means that the term support is ambiguous
and subjective as it does not reflect the real
level of support a tool has for a specified MD.
Hence, each tool has its own capabilities
required to be bench marked (Ahmed &
Dharaskar, 2008; MSAB Blog, 2011).
The evolution in MDs capabilities, ranging
from battery life, memory, processing power,
and the changes in the computing and
communications
paradigms
through
virtualization, cloud computing, distributed
network storage, combined with useful
spectrum of applications has transformed
them into rather powerful computing and
communications devices. The level of
configuration and personalization in the MDs
is also on the rise. Modern MDs are very
flexible and provide interfaces for various
tasks which have also opened possibilities to
easily exploit anti-forensics techniques. The
user of an older MD (for example Nokia 3310)
cannot change for instance the default
location settings of data objects generated as
a consequence of the normal usage of the
device. However with the new smartphones,
the user can manipulate these default location
settings or even install other third party
applications to change the contents of the
corresponding data objects.
Text messages can be a good example to
understand
the
complexities
being
encountered by the forensics tools. These
messages are now not only generated by the
native application in SMS format but also by
many third party apps (for example
Handcent, Viber, Whatsapp, Twitter, Skype
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and Hangout). Every application provides
different levels of customization and operates
on different standards and formats to work
with the corresponding data objects. In order
to answer these questions, a framework is
proposed to check the quality of data
extracted by a mobile forensic tool with
emphasis on anti-forensic techniques and to
quantify the term “supported” in the context
of a MDFT.

1.2 Related Work
NIST has evaluated some MDFTs against
their specifications and published the results
(National Institute of Standards and
Technology
(NIST),
2013).
NIST
specifications (National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST), 2010a) have six core
and fifteen optional requirements. In addition,
the work has proposed a tool testing plan
(National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST), 2010b) based on these
specifications (National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST), 2010a). The plan has
thirty two (32) compulsory assertions and
forty four (44) optional assertions. NIST has
defined the following twenty (20) profiles by
using different combinations of these seventy
six (76) assertions.
1. Connectivity (between the tool and
the MD)
2. Data Acquisition and Interpretation
a. Presentation
b. Subscriber and Equipment
Related Data
c. Personal Information
Management (PIM) Data
d. Call Logs
e. Text Messages (SMS, EMS,
MMS)
f. Stand-alone Multi-media Data
g. Application Data
h. Internet Related Data
3. Location Related Data
4. Tool Acquisition Variations
5. Device Data Not Modified
6. Generated Reports / Preview-Pane
7. Case File/Data Protection
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8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

SIM PIN/PUK Authentication
Physical Acquisition
Non-ASCII Character Presentation
Stand-alone Acquisition
Hashing
GPS Reporting

Similarly some formal techniques were also
presented (Kubi et al., 2011; Saleem et al.,
2014, 2013; Saleem & Popov, 2013) to help
select the most appropriate tool. All of them
relied on the specifications by NIST that were
defined in 2010. One of the obvious problems
associated with NIST specification is that,
MDs (since 2010) have gone through so many
changes that a revision and enrichment to
these specifications and corresponding test
plans is required.
The remaining sections of this paper
explain the terms being used in the
introduction, the extension to the NIST
testing plan and its evaluation using two
MDFTs. Discussion on the standard used to
quantify the term “support” for all the twenty
profiles is followed by a concluding section
that includes a discussion on the framework,
its application, the test results and the
direction of future research in this domain.

2. MOBILE DEVICE
FORENSICS
Mobile Device Forensics (MoDeFo) is a
branch of digital forensics where the main
goal is the retrieval of data or evidence from
MDs and similar devices (Bhadsavle & Wang,
2009). MoDeFo is based on proven scientific
methodologies to collect facts regarding an
object, an artifact, or an event in a specific
time frame in order to determine if the object
under consideration claims to be or is just
alleges its existence (Casey, 2009).
As posited earlier, MDs have become
dynamic mobile computing platforms due to
the constant upgrades, changes and new
additions. The lack of forensic tools that will
be able to retrieve data and thereby be
compatible with the continuous surge of new
mobile device models is a problem being faced
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by the experts in MoDeFo (Bhadsavle &
Wang, 2009).

2.1 Sources of Evidence
Gonzalez et al. (2011) outlined major types of
evidence that can be obtained from MDs.
These include call logs, SMS, contacts,
calendar, memos, multimedia items, notes,
videos, maps, internet browsing history,
screenshots, voicemails, wireless network data
etc. They also explain some of the challenges
that arise when it comes to MoDeFo and the
potential outcomes from an investigation.
For instance, Curran et al. (2010) state
that, the most viable evidence that gives a
clear cut between traditional computers and
mobile phones is the location data. The hint
about the specific location of the person at the
time of an incident is important for numerous
investigations. This important piece of
location data may be obtained from various
sources of the MDs (Gonzalez et al., 2011).

2.2 Mobile Device Forensics Tools
MDFTs
are
the
main
tools
aside
synchronization software, which are used in
the extraction of data from MDs (Jansen et
al., 2008). In fact, they form an interface with
which the examiner can connect to the MD to
view,
extract or examine its contents
(Williamson & Apeldoorn, 2005). For
extracted data to be admissible in the court of
law, a forensic expert should be able to show
that the data is forensically sound which
means that it has not been tampered with
during the entire investigation process (Casey,
2009). Two MDFTs were selected to test the
proposed framework. Their names are kept
confidential and hence are denoted by the
variables “U” and “X”.

2.3 Extraction Methods
Manual extraction, logical extraction and
physical extraction are the three main
methods used to extract data from MDs. We
used logical and physical extraction and a
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brief introduction of these methods is given
below.
2.3.1

Manual Extraction

In this type of extraction the examiners go
through the documentation of an MD and
manually access and record information on
the screen (Brothers, 2007; Casey, 2011).
Documentation is done to preserve the chain
of custody and to ensure that every detail is
well captured/recorded. In this case, data
which is accessible through the operating
system is retrieved and captured either by
photographing or videotaping (Casey, 2011).
Physically damaged phone is a problem with
this type of extraction such as the case when
the keys fail to respond and the screen has
cracks or it is damaged (Brothers, 2007).
2.3.2

Logical Extraction

In logical extraction, a connection is
established between the mobile devices and
the computer of the examiner via Bluetooth,
cable or infra-red interface using protocols
such as OBEX, BREW, AT commands and
F-BUS. Only data which is accessible through
the operating system is extracted and
communication works only through a
client/server mode (Brothers, 2007; Casey,
2011).
Disabled data port is a major problem
with this type of extraction (Brothers, 2007).
If a phone has a security code enabled and the
modem mode disabled then the phone needs
to be set to modem mode before logical
extraction can proceed (due to the need for
inter device communication). Moreover, if the
phone is locked and the modem port is also
disabled then it becomes difficult to do
extraction and one may need to resort to a
manual extraction.
2.3.3

Physical Extraction

Physical extraction deals with mining of the
entire
memory
content
through
communication ports. It is accomplished by
using a boot loader or an unsigned code which
is pushed into the memory of the mobile

© 2014 ADFSL

JDFSL V9N2
phone. The data that is pushed out through
the communication conduit is stored in a raw
HEX or binary format. The interpretation of
the binary data is dependent on how the data
is stored in the memory of the phone. An
example of the interfaces used in this type of
extraction is the JTAG interface. It allows a
complete extraction of the memory. Many of
the mobile forensic tool vendors have begun
to support more phones in this type of
extraction over the last couple of years.
(Brothers, 2007; Casey, 2011)
This type of extraction is time consuming
and the output is difficult to analyze. Dumped
and decoded data cannot be easily compared
to what is seen on the interface of the MD.

2.4 Anti Forensics
For long, criminals have used anti-forensics
techniques to thwart evidence on weapons or
other artifacts they have used in a crime scene
and thus misleading investigators to make
wrong conclusions (Ispirian, 2013). Wearing
gloves to avoid finger prints on the weapons
used in the crime was one of the simple yet
effective techniques. In a similar way, the
wrongdoers have implored the concept of antiforensic techniques to cover their digital foot
prints. The term “anti-forensics” therefore
refer to a combination of software tools and
techniques designed to impede the digital
investigation and to make it difficult for a
forensic examiner to find or locate data, or to
make potential evidence inadmissible in the
court of law (Ispirian, 2013).
2.4.1

Anti-Forensic Methods

There are four main methods to perform antiforensics namely, data contraception, data
hiding, data destruction and data misdirection
(Bilby, 2006).
1. Data Contraception: prevents the
potential evidence from existing
somewhere on the phones memory
where it can be analyzed. For
example, using a memory only
malware to force execution on just a
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certain part of the phone’s main
memory.
2. Data Hiding: In this case, potential
evidence data is put on the disk
somewhere unlikely for the forensic
tools to locate. For example, placing a
picture in the root directory of a
rooted/jail broken MD, as the forensic
tools may go to the default picture
related folders to extract them as
evidence.
3. Data Destruction: involves destroying
any evidence before a forensics activity
(such as wiping the memory by a
special application). It may be used to
manipulate the potential data stored
in the phone memory according to a
set of user specified instructions, such
as slowing down the connectivity to
the forensic tool and then deleting
potential evidence data before allowing
the tool to start extraction.
4. Data Misdirection: provides the
forensic tools with false data that is
indistinguishable from the real thing.
For example, changing a .pdf file to an
.exe file and thus making it look like
an executable.
It is really hard to extract any useful
information after data destruction. In this
case finding unique patterns in the memory or
the artifacts related to a data destruction tool
are usually enough to convict an individual
for spoliation. Similarly, data contraception is
related to physical memory or RAM analysis
so out of the scope of this work and the
proposed framework. Therefore, the remaining
two methods (data hiding and data
misdirection) were used in creating and
testing the proposed framework.

3. MOS1 TESTING
FRAMEWORK FOR MOBILE
DEVICE FORENSICS
The basic aim of the framework is the
evaluation of MDFTs with emphasis on anti1 Maxwell, Oliver and Shahzad
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forensics and quantification of the term
“support”. In addition, it provides some level
of quality assurance for the performance of
the tool with respect to a specific profile.
Quality assurance is defined as “a planned and
systematic pattern of all the actions which are
necessary to provide adequate confidence that
an item or a product conforms to established
technical requirements.” (Radatz, Geraci, &
Katki, 1990)
The framework is based on the Carrier’s
attribute list (Carrier, 2003). The list outlines
the following major attributes that a digital
forensic tool must possess:
1. Usability: is the ability of a tool to
present evidence in accurate and
unambiguous format so as to prevent
misinterpretation.
2. Comprehensive: is the ability of a tool
to present all the forms of extracted
evidence inclusive of exculpatory and
inculpatory evidence.
3. Accuracy: is the ability of a tool to
present extracted evidence accurately
with a known margin of error to
ensure the correctness of the results.
4. Deterministic: is the ability of a tool
to produce consistent results.
5. Verifiable: is the ability of a tool to
ensure accuracy of the results either
via using an independent tool or
manual means.
MOS framework actually extends the test
plan from NIST by including assertions and
test actions to cover anti-forensics as well.
The section below will only discuss the new
profiles introduced by our framework. The
ones not discussed must be treated in
accordance to the original NIST test plan
(National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST), 2010b).

3.1 Personal Information Management
(PIM)
Assertion MOS-AO-01: If a cellular forensic
tool completes acquisition of the target device
without error then address book entries shall
be presented in a useable format even if some
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fields are manipulated with data hiding or
misdirecting intentions.
Assertion MOS-AO-02: If a cellular
forensic tool completes acquisition of the
target device without any error then
datebook, calendar and note entries shall be
presented in a useable format, even if the
associated data is hidden or misdirected by
setting wrong date and time stamps.
Test Action: Populate integer fields and
leave character fields empty.
Test Action: Populate character fields and
leave integer fields empty.
Test Action: Set calendar entries to “x”
years later or earlier. Whereas x = 1,2,3…
Conformance Indicator: Acquired PIM
data matches known PIM data for all test
cases.

3.2 Call Logs
Assertion MOS-AO-03: If a cellular forensic
tool completes acquisition of a target device
without error then the corresponding
date/timestamps and the duration of the call
shall be presented in a useable format and it
should be reported in UTC to counter any
impact of the change in the time zone.

JDFSL V9N2
the sorts of text messaging applications
should be included (for instance, Skype,
Viber, Whatsapp, Twitter, Facebook). Hence
all the instances of EMS, SMS and MMS in
all the appropriate core and optional
assertions must be replaced, tested and
evaluated against this generic class of
messages.
Assertion MOS-AO-04: If a cellular
forensic tool completes acquisition of the
target device without error then text messages
not only from the default location but from
any possible location shall be presented in a
useable format to counter any data hiding
attempts.
Assertion MOS-AO-05: If a cellular
forensic tool completes acquisition of the
target device without error then the
corresponding date/time stamps for text
messages shall be presented in useable format
and reported in UTC to counter any impact
of the change in time zone.
Assertion MOS-AO-06: If a cellular
forensic tool completes acquisition of the
target device without error then text messages
even if locked shall be presented in a useable
format to counter any data hiding attempts.

Test Action: Populate
memory with incoming calls

the

internal

Test Action: If MD has the capability,
then create a new folder and move messages
to the newly created folder.

Test Action: Populate
memory with missed calls

the

internal

Test Action: Change the time zone of the
device before beginning data population.

Test Action: Populate
memory with outgoing calls

the

internal

Test Action: If MD has lock feature,
activate the lock on all the possible messages.

Conformance Indicator: Acquired call log
data matches known call log data, acquired
timestamp is reported in UTC for all calls and
all the fields/attributes are duly reported.

Conformance Indicator: Acquired text
messages match known text messages,
timestamps are reported in UTC/Device and
all entries from all the locations and all the
fields duly reported.

3.3 Text Messages (EMS, SMS, MMS and
Third Party Applications)
Class of text messages shall not be confined to
the messages originating from the native
applications in the form of EMS, SMS and
MMS only, but artifacts associated with all

© 2014 ADFSL

3.4 Stand-alone Multi-media Data (Audio,
Video and Graphics)
Assertion MOS-AO-07: If a cellular forensic
tool completes acquisition of the target device
without error then stand-alone multi-media
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files both from default and any other location
shall be presented in a useable format.
Test Action: Populate data into the
default folder.
Test Action: If the device has capability,
create a new folder and move files into the
newly created folder
Conformance Indicator: Acquired multimedia matches known multi-media data for
both test cases.
Assertion MOS-AO-08: If a cellular
forensic tool completes acquisition of the
target device without error then stand-alone
multi-media files with missing header/footer
shall be presented in a useable format.
Test Action: Populate the MD with multimedia files having headers and or footers
modified. Hex Editor by NEO was used to
modify the headers and footers of different
files.

Testing Framework for Mobile Device …
Assertion MOS-AO-10: If a cellular
forensic tool completes acquisition of the
target device without error then stand-alone
multi-media files which are corrupted shall be
presented as corrupted.
Test Action: Populate the device default
location with corrupted files.
Test Action: Relocate corrupted files to
non-default locations.
Conformance Indicator: The acquired
multi-media data matches the known multimedia data and the device also reports that
the file has been tampered or corrupted.
Assertion MOS-AO-11: If a cellular
forensic tool provides support for multi-media
files of the target device then the tool shall
successfully acquire large data from the target
device without error.
Test Action: Populate device
location with large multi-media files.

default

Test Action: Relocate files to a nondefault location.

Test Action: Relocate large multi-media
files to non-default locations.

Conformance Indicator: Acquired multimedia data matches the known multi-media
data for both cases and the status of the data
reported as tempered or corrupted2.

Conformance Indicator: Acquired multimedia data matches the known multi-media
data and the extraction does not terminate
prematurely.

Assertion MOS-AO-09: If a cellular
forensic tool completes acquisition of the
target device without error then stand-alone
multi-media files with missing/modified
extensions shall be presented in a useable
format.
Test Action: Populate the device default
location with files having file extensions
modified.
Test Action: Relocate the files to nondefault location.
Conformance Indicator: Acquired multimedia data matches the known multi-media
data for both cases and the tool reports the
exact file type.

3.5 Application Data
Application data means data in the form of
text documents, spreadsheet, power-points,
pdf and other document formats.
Assertion MOS-AO-12: If a cellular
forensic tool completes acquisition of the
target device without error then application
data files both from default and any other
location shall be presented in a useable
format.
Test Action: Populate device data into the
default folders.
Test Action: If the device has capability,
create a new folder and move files into the
newly created folder

2 Corrupted in the sense of header/footer or
extension(s)

Page 228

© 2014 ADFSL

Testing Framework for Mobile Device …
Conformance
Indicator:
Acquired
application data matches the known
application data for both the test cases.
Assertion MOS-AO-13: If a cellular
forensic tool completes the acquisition of the
target device without error then application
data files with missing header/footer shall be
presented in a useable format.
Test Action: Populate the device default
location with files having header and footer
modified.
Test Action: Relocate files to non-default
locations.
Conformance
Indicator:
Acquired
application data matches the known
application data for both the cases and the
data are reported as tempered corrupted.
Assertion MOS-AO-14: If a cellular
forensic tool completes the acquisition of the
target device without error then application
data files with missing/modified extensions
shall be presented in a useable format.
Test Action: Populate device default
location with files having file extensions
modified.
Test Action: Relocate files to non-default
location.
Conformance
Indicator:
Acquired
application data matches the known
application data for both cases.
Assertion MOS-AO-15: If a cellular
forensic tool provides support for application
data files of the target device then the tool
shall successfully acquire large data files from
the target device without any error.
Test Action: Populate
locations with large files.

device

default

Test Action: Relocate these files to nondefault locations.
Conformance
Indicator:
Acquired
application data matches the known
application data. Extraction does not
terminate prematurely.
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Assertion MOS-AO-16: If a cellular
forensic tool completes the acquisition of the
target device without an error then
application data files which are corrupted
shall be presented as corrupted.
Test Action: Populate device
locations with corrupted files.

default

Test Action: Relocate corrupted files to
non-default locations.
Conformance
Indicator:
Acquired
application data matches the known
application data and the tool reports that the
file has been tampered with or corrupted.

4. EVALUATING MOS
TESTING FRAMEWORK
The framework was evaluated by testing the
aforementioned tools via experimentation
(Ayers, 2007). The results were documented
and a method to quantify the level of the
term “support” was also introduced.
Each tool was tested against all the test
assertions including seventy six (76) from
NIST test plan and sixteen (16) from MOS
framework. For each assertion the tool was
awarded a number from 0, 1 or 2 depending
on the following criteria.
a) 2 – Obtained results conform to the
expected results. It means that the
data was found and duly reported
b) 1 – Obtained results were rather closer
to the expected results, which mean
that the assertion was on borderline
(neither passed nor failed).
c) 0 – Obtained results did not conform
to the expected results or not found.
Then the tool was assigned grades for each
of the twenty profiles using equation (1) and
equation (2). The grades can help quantify
the term support for each profile. Grading
was done for NIST assertions alone (Equation
1), MOS assertions alone (Equation 1) and
the combination of NIST and MOS assertions
(Equation 2). The framework increased the
resolution of quantification levels for the term
support to suit the requirements of an
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investigator and give him an opportunity to
select the appropriate tool for his/her needs.

5. RESULTS AND
DISCUSSION

Table 1 Grading Scale
Support Level

Percentage Score

A1 – A10

91 -100

B1 – B10

81 - 90

C1 – C10

71-80

D1 – D10

61-70

E1 – E10

51-60

F

score ≤ 50

score = (p ÷ n) × 100

(1)

scorecombined = (2 × CA + AO) ÷ 3

(2)

Whereas, p = total points obtained for a
specific profile and n = total number points
for that specific profile. Each assertion can
give a maximum of two (2) points and a tool
can obtain any discrete point from zero (0) to
two (2) depending on the test results.
scorecombined represents the combined score of
both compulsory assertions (CA) and optional
assertions (AO) for a profile. CA were given
double the importance than AO while
calculating scorecombined (Equation 2). Grading
is done following the scale in Table 1.

Table 2 represents the evaluation results of
our framework. Two tools “X” and “U” were
tested for all the new sixteen assertions in
MOS and seventy six assertions in NIST using
two MDs (Samsung Galaxy S4 Gt-i9505 and
iPhone 4 A1332). The results of all these
assertions were used to get the grades for each
profile. There are six grades (A to F) and
each grade has then ten steps within (1 to 10)
to increase the resolution. It has a potential to
precisely quantify the level of support for each
tool in a given profile.
Table 2 represents the evaluation results
in three forms. It has the evaluation results
against the new assertions introduced in MOS
only (using Equation 1), assertions in NIST
only (using Equation 1) and all the assertions
in NIST and MOS combined (using Equation
2). It can help quantify the level of support
for anti-forensics only, NIST only and
combined depending on the requirements of
the case being investigated. Table 2 shows
that tool “X” scores better grades for most of
the profiles in MOS only, NIST only and
MOS+NIST.

Table 2 Evaluation Results
Support Level

Data Acquisition and
Interpretation
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Connectivity (between the tool and the MD)
--Presentation
--Subscriber and Equipment Related Data
--Personal Information Management (PIM)
Data
--Call Logs
--Text Messages
--Stand-alone Multi-media Data
--Application Data
--Internet Related Data
Location Related Data
Tool Acquisition Variations
Device Data Not Modified

MOS
X

U

A10

F

NIST

MOS+NIST

X
E6
A10
A10
C5

U
D7
A10
D7
C5

X
E6
A10
A10
C8

U
D7
A10
D7
D9

A10 A10 A10
A10 A10 A4
C10 F A10
D3 F
F
A10
A10
C8
A10

A2
B7
A10
A10
A10
A10
C8
A10

A10
A6
A3
E4
A10
A10
C8
A10

A4
B10
C10
C5
A10
A10
C8
A10
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Generated Reports / Preview-Pane
Case File/Data Protection
SIM PIN/PUK Authentication
Physical Acquisition
Non-ASCII Character Presentation
Stand-alone Acquisition
Hashing
GPS Reporting

A10
F
A10
F
A10
A10
F
A10

A10
F
D7
D7
F
A10
F
A10

A10
F
A10
F
A10
A10
F
A10

A10
F
D7
D7
F
A10
F
A10

Table 3 Individual scores for each assertion in NIST and MOS
Assertion

X

U

Assertion

X

U

Assertion

X

U

SPT-CA-01
SPT-CA-02
SPT-CA-03
SPT-CA-04
SPT-CA-05
SPT-CA-06
SPT-CA-07
SPT-CA-08
SPT-CA-09
SPT-CA-10
SPT-CA-11
SPT-CA-12
SPT-CA-13
SPT-CA-14
SPT-CA-15
SPT-CA-16
SPT-CA-17
SPT-CA-18
SPT-CA-19
SPT-CA-20
SPT-CA-21
SPT-CA-22
SPT-CA-23
SPT-CA-24
SPT-CA-25
SPT-CA-26
SPT-CA-27
SPT-CA-28
SPT-CA-29
SPT-CA-30
SPT-CA-31

2
0
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
0
0
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
2
2
2
2

2
0
2
2
0
2
1
2
1
0
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

SPT-CA-32
SPT-OA-01
SPT-OA-02
SPT-OA-03
SPT-OA-04
SPT-OA-05
SPT-OA-06
SPT-OA-07
SPT-OA-08
SPT-OA-09
SPT-OA-10
SPT-OA-11
SPT-OA-12
SPT-OA-13
SPT-OA-14
SPT-OA-15
SPT-OA-16
SPT-OA-17
SPT-OA-18
SPT-OA-19
SPT-OA-20
SPT-OA-21
SPT-OA-22
SPT-OA-23
SPT-OA-24
SPT-OA-25
SPT-OA-26
SPT-OA-27
SPT-OA-28
SPT-OA-29
SPT-OA-30

2
2
0
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
0
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
0
2
2
2
0
0
2
2
0
2
2
2

2
2
0
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
0
2
1
2
2
1
2
2
0
2
2
2
0
0
2
2
0
2
1
1

SPT-OA-31
SPT-OA-32
SPT-OA-33
SPT-OA-34
SPT-OA-35
SPT-OA-36
SPT-OA-37
SPT-OA-38
SPT-OA-39
SPT-OA-40
SPT-OA-41
SPT-OA-42
SPT-OA-43
SPT-OA-44
MOS-AO-01
MOS-AO-02
MOS-AO-03
MOS-AO-04
MOS-AO-05
MOS-AO-06
MOS-AO-07
MOS-AO-08
MOS-AO-09
MOS-AO-10
MOS-AO-11
MOS-AO-12
MOS-AO-13
MOS-AO-14
MOS-AO-15
MOS-AO-16

2
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
0
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
0
2
2
1
2
2
0

2
2
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
2
0
2
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
0
0
0
2
2
0
0
0
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Table 3 carries the raw results in the form of
assertions with their obtained marks for both
“X” and “U” tools. These were used in
equation (1), equation (2) to calculate the
combined scores. Combined scores were used
in the light of the scale (Table 1) to calculate
the grades representing the level of support
for each profile.

6. CONCLUSION
The increasing capabilities of the mobile
devices, as well as the ongoing changes in the
communication and computing paradigms, in
addition to global wide-spread usage and
many benefits in the professional and private
activities to their users, has also opened up
many opportunities for their abuse in
unwanted deeds and actions including the use
of anti-forensics techniques to avoid detection
while being investigated. Moreover, the
sophistication of the users and available
applications makes it much easier to exploit
various anti-forensics techniques in order to
hinder prospective digital investigations. In
order to address these challenges, it was
required to extend the NIST smartphone test
plan with an emphasis to counter any
potential anti-forensics attempts. The novel
testing framework, based on the existing
NIST criteria and MOS extension can
evaluate a MDFT while taking care of the use
of potential anti-forensics techniques as well.
As of today, we have found that the term
“supported” with respect to MDFT is also
subjective. Quantification of the term
“support” is another advantage of using the
MOS framework, as an extension of the NIST
one from 2010. The framework introduces a
standard to define and then tag the term
support to a MDFT.
The resolution of the level of support is
also quite high; hence it can potentially
quantify the level of support with fairly high
precision. Consequently, it can help an
investigator to select the tool with an
unambiguously defined support level for a
particular profile. A better choice of the tool

Page 232

Testing Framework for Mobile Device …
can result in saving time and effort required
to perform a digital investigation.
To the best of our knowledge, this is an
innovative way of looking into the problem of
MDFT evaluation. Currently, we have only
introduced sixteen new assertions in only five
profiles. To make the framework more robust,
encompassing, and to a certain degree more
general, we will explore and extend more
areas (profiles) where anti-forensics techniques
can potentially be employed.
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